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CONCEPTUALIZING MEANING
ConCeitualizando SignifiCado
Jasper Doomen*
ABSTRACT – Descriptions have been the object of attention of many 
philosophers. The goal of this article is to inquire into the meaning of 
those descriptions which, due to the peculiar character of the objects of 
description, have been interpreted in different ways, and to investigate 
in which sense one is able to speak of the existence (or non-existence) of 
an object of description. The various sorts of descriptions are inquired; 
the question which entities exist and which do not is dealt with, and, 
in relation to this, how ‘meaning’ is to be understood.
KEYWORDS – Descriptions. Objects of description. Meaning. Language.
RESUMO – Descrições têm sido o objeto da atenção de muitos filósofos. 
O objetivo desse artigo é investigar o significado daquelas descrições 
que, devido ao caráter particular dos objetos de descrição, foram 
interpretadas de diferentes modos, e investigar em que sentido alguém 
é capaz de falar sobre a existência (ou a não-existência) de um objeto de 
descrição. Os vários tipos de descrições são investigados; a pergunta 
sobre que entidades existem e quais não existem é tratada e, com 
relação a isso, de que modo o ‘significado’ deve ser entendido.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Descrições. Objetos de descrição. Significado. 
Linguagem.
Introduction
The question what meaning is has led to a large number of approaches. 
Where may meaning be found? How can it exist? In this article, these 
questions will be dealt with. In any enquiry it is of importance to try 
to find a theory that does not rest upon suppositions which cannot be 
justified, or at least clarified.
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When meaning is the subject of enquiry, this entails that theories 
which defend the existence of a meaning existing independently of (users 
of) language are to be investigated. This is done in the first section. It 
has a wider scope, however, dealing with the various sorts of objects 
which may involve meaning. As it will turn out, it is not enough to 
discuss a reference and a meaning; a large number of situations cannot 
be explained without a third element, a secondary reference, as I shall 
call it.
Section 2 deals with some particular problems concerning descriptions 
of a difficult nature. In order to demonstrate these problems, a logical 
analysis is presented in section 3. An attempt to solve a number of 
problems which arise from the ambiguity that is characteristic for natural 
language is undertaken by this means as well. I have, throughout this 
article, tried to take a critical and cautious stance; I prefer a lack of a large 
number of certainties to a situation in which the price for the desired 
results is a dogmatic attitude.
1  The place of meaning
1.1
When a description of something is given, an important question 
connected with this act is whether the thing or person described exists. 
Few problems present themselves when one is dealing with common 
descriptions like ‘this man’, ‘the president of the U.S. in 1863’ and ‘the 
author of Moby-Dick’. However, it is possible to distinguish statements 
that do not render contradictions when compared with external reality 
but do not refer to an external object.
Bolzano claims that there are certain conceptions to which no object 
corresponds1. He gives as examples Nothingness, a green virtue, a round 
quadrangle and a golden mountain. Russell’s claim, that these ‘objects’ 
infringe upon the law of non-contradiction2, seems to me to be too narrow 
a point of view: it is the case for some things, but not for all. I think the 
so-called things mentioned should not be considered all at one and the 
same level; there are important distinctions to be made. Keeping these in 
mind, I shall distinguish three levels here; it is possible that there exists 
a greater number than this, but I won’t deal with that here; in fact, only 
the third and, to a lesser extent, the second level are of importance.
1  See BOLZANO, B. “Wissenschaftslehre – Teil I und Teil II”. In: BOLZANO, B. 
Gesamtausgabe. Stuttgart/Bad-Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, Reihe I, Band 
11, 1985, § 67, p. 112-113.
2  See RUSSEL, B. “On Denoting”, Mind, 14 (1905), p. 482-483.J. Doomen – Conceptualizing meaning
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The first level at which non-existing things can be classified deals 
with so-called things that cannot be expressed particularly, such as 
Nothingness. This sort of so-called things is irrelevant for this article and 
will receive no further attention. The second level is that of the impossible 
so-called things. A distinction must be made here between things which 
are impossible because of their nature on the one hand and those which 
are so because of their essence. Obviously, a green (an example at the 
first level) cannot exist: a virtue, an abstract value, cannot have a colour, 
after all3; by attributing ‘green’ to a virtue, one makes a category mistake. 
‘A round quadrangle’ (an example at the second level) is impossible for 
another reason. Here, an object which is essentially formed with four 
angles is concerned. If it ceases to have four angles, it ceases to be what 
it is, namely a quadrangle. A round quadrangle, one may say, contradicts 
external reality4.
The third level is concerned with non-existing things that do not 
contradict external reality. It may not be possible to find a golden 
mountain in the outside world, but it is not inconceivable that one 
exists (one may conceive a possible world in which at least one golden 
mountain exists).
This also applies to ‘the present king of France’. Only when one 
knows about the form of government of France is one able to determine 
that the description does not correspond to external reality. Clearly, 
propositions concerning so-called things at the third level are not as easily 
dismissed as those at the second are. It is useful to examine Meinong’s 
attitude concerning this matter. He presents a theory according to 
which the things whose existence is denied somehow ‘exist’ none the 
less: “[…] If I should, regarding an object, be able to judge that it does 
not exist, I seem first somehow have to grasp the object, in order to 
state the not-being of it, more precisely to predicate it to it, or deny it 
of it”5.
According to Meinong, there must be ‘Aussersein’ (literally: ‘outside of 
being’)6, a situation in which the thing neither exists nor does not exist – 
the existence of a thing is external to it7 – and which forms the vestibule,   
 
3  I will forgo a discussion whether the word ‘virtue’ has a meaning at all here.
4  I readily grant that this is crudely formulated: ‘contradicting external reality’ is a (very) 
vague phrase. I have nonetheless used it here since the focus in this article is on the 
philosophy of language and not on epistemology; formulating a precise position would 
merely needlessly complicate things.
5  MEINONG, A. “Abhandlungen zur Erkenntnistheorie und Gegenstandstheorie: Über 
Gegenstands-theorie”. In: MEINONG, A. Gesamtausgabe. Graz: Akademische Druck – 
u. Verlagsanstallt, Band 2, 1971, p. 491.
6  Ibid.
7  Ibid., p. 494.J. Doomen – Conceptualizing meaning
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as it were, of judging, on the basis of which it becomes apparent whether 
the thing exists or does not exist (outside of Aussersein).
1.2
Having established the various levels, it is now possible to inquire 
critically into the instances where a meaning is possible. Concerning the 
things at the second level, Meinong’s argumentation cannot be accepted: 
it is not the case that one has a notion of a round quadrangle of which 
one subsequently denies that this represents a quadrangle existing in the 
outside world. What Bolzano, as a logical realist, has to say about this, 
that to these things corresponds a ‘Vorstellung an sich’8, (a representation 
as such) is not tenable, in my opinion: a notion always needs a subject 
imagining it. Be that as it may, a more serious problem presents itself: 
one has to imagine a round quadrangle.
According to Bolzano, saying ‘a round quadrangle’, one does not claim 
anything, but a representation is created (in the mind) (Bolzano uses the 
word ‘vorgestellt’)9. This is impossible, however. As soon as one tries to 
imagine the quadrangle as round, it ceases to be a quadrangle. Now the 
question emerges how one is capable of forming the sentence: ‘There 
are no round quadrangles’. After all, if one is not capable of forming a 
notion of round quadrangles, the sentence seems to have no meaning. 
One does not even know what one is thinking (as there is nothing to 
think about in this case).
Indeed, I do not think the sentence has a meaning. I will return to this 
point later. At the moment, it’s useful to analyse the sentence. ‘There are 
no round quadrangles’ consists of four parts: ‘there’, ‘are’, ‘no’ and ‘round 
quadrangles’. What is imagined when one is confronted with the first 
three parts? Nothing, really: they are words which serve a function within 
the sentence. ‘No’ is merely a negative element and ‘there’ indicates 
‘anywhere’ (which does not excite a representation since anyone’s scope 
is limited and does not comprise the entire universe). ‘Are’ is a difficult 
part of the sentence, but obviously no representation corresponds to 
this. These parts do not necessarily have to have a meaning, just as long 
as the sentence has one. So the sentence ‘there are no paintings in this 
room’, e.g., may have a meaning. In ‘there are no round quadrangles’, 
however, the crucial element is problematic.
This argument would perhaps suffice, were it not that ‘round 
quadrangles’, other than the other parts of the sentence, is the composition  
 
8  See BOLZANO, B. “Wissenschaftslehre – Teil I und Teil II”. In: BOLZANO, B., op. cit., 
§ 67, p. 112.
9  Ibid., § 19, p. 103.J. Doomen – Conceptualizing meaning
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of an adjective and a noun and a thing corresponding to it is expected 
here. In section 1, I indicated why ‘a round quadrangle’ cannot exist. 
The description does not excite a representation, either. In fact, ‘a round 
quadrangle’ is only a composition of two words that has no function. It 
can be called a ‘flatus vocis’: the words exist, but nothing corresponds to 
them. The fact that the first three words do not invoke a representation 
is not problematic, as long as the thing described does: the sentence 
‘there are no unicorns’ has a meaning (provided one imagines something 
corresponding to ‘unicorns’).
Things at the third level cannot be dealt with this easily. It is 
important to distinguish two sublevels within the third level. An example 
of the first is the before mentioned ‘a golden mountain’. Assuming that 
such a mountain cannot be found anywhere, the question arises what 
the status of the statement ‘There is a golden mountain’ is. One can 
imagine such a mountain. Does this mean that it exists ‘ausser sein’? 
By no means. When one imagines a golden mountain, a mountain is 
imagined, examples of which have been seen, or descriptions of which 
have at least been heard or read, whereupon the predicate ‘golden’ is 
connected to this representation. ‘Golden mountain’ is a construction from 
these two notions, just as (I assume) ‘unicorn’ is a construction based on 
the representations of a horse and a horn.
Meinong makes an epistemological shift, supposing that the 
composition ‘(a) golden mountain’ would exist primarily. Instead of 
thinking that a notion of a golden mountain is created on the basis of the 
experience of one or several mountains on the one hand and the colour 
golden on the other, Meinong starts on the other side and presupposes 
the golden mountain as a whole.
This objection cannot be maintained concerning the second sublevel. 
‘The king of France in 2010’10, abbreviated hereafter as ‘Kf 2010’, is 
not the result of abstraction from two or more concepts. In order to 
establish whether one imagines something when saying ‘Kf 2010 is 
bald’, an enquiry into the meaning is required. According to Russell, 
this proposition does not refer, but it does have a meaning. I will 
argue that one can only speak of meaning when there is a reference; 
however, ‘reference’ must be understood in a broader way than is usually 
done.
When the sentences ‘The president of the U.S. in 2010 is bald’ and ‘Kf 
2010 is bald’ are verified, the first sentence turns out to be false. What 
about the second one? According to Russell’s approach, it is false as there 
10  I prefer to use this description to the one used in section 1 (‘The present king of France’), 
since the latter is bound by context.J. Doomen – Conceptualizing meaning
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was no king of France in 201011. Strawson refutes this thought: “[…] The 
question of whether [someone’s] statement [that the king of France is 
bald, or, as in Strawson’s example, wise (which one of these properties 
is attributed is not important for the example)] was true or false simply 
didn’t arise, because there was no such person as the king of France”12.
What Strawson says here is important, but not radical enough. He 
maintains Russell’s statement13 that the statement has a meaning14. What 
does this comprise, however? Suppose an unmarried man is invited to 
a gathering and is mistakenly asked: ‘Will your wife be there as well?’ 
According to Russell’s and Strawson’s analyses, this sentence has a 
meaning, despite the fact that it does not refer. However, the bachelor, 
on hearing ‘your wife’, has no representation of his wife (as there is none) 
and neither does the inquirer: he simply states a question, the form of 
which is the same as it would be if it had been asked to someone else 
whose marital status is unknown to him. The question would, by contrast, 
have had a meaning if it had been directed at a married man, in such a 
way that the inquirer not only knew that he was married, but also knew 
his wife or had at least heard or read a description of her (and had a 
representation of her when he asked the question). Here, however, the 
words are, one could say, empty. Nothing is represented and the sentence 
accordingly has no meaning.
In order to illustrate his statement that ‘Kf 2010’ has a meaning, 
Strawson gives an interesting example15: One may tell a story about 
the king of France and ascribe all sorts of predicates to him. In this 
case, one has a representation (of the king of France). It is important to 
distinguish the representation of the speaker from the one the hearer 
has. It is either the case that the speaker has a certain representation 
and gives information of this to the hearer, who, on this basis, creates 
a representation of his own until this is sufficient, or that the speaker 
states something about a thing which has no existence in external reality, 
the situation being one in which the speaker has no representation, and 
the hearer creates a representation which ceases to be at the moment 
information which is not conformable to external reality is provided.
An example of the first situation is the representation the speaker has 
of Lincoln. He has a lot of information about this person at his disposal 
and has a representation of Lincoln on the basis of this. If he presents this   
 
11  Nor in, for example, 1950, when Russell was still alive.
12  See STRAWSON, P . F. “On Referring”, Mind, 59 (1950), p. 330.
13  See RUSSELL, B. Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy. London-New York: 
Routledge, 1993, p. 179; RUSSELL, B. “On Denoting”, op. cit., p. 483, 484.
14  See STRAWSON, P . F. “On Referring”, op. cit., p. 331.
15  Ibid.J. Doomen – Conceptualizing meaning
90  Veritas, v. 57, n. 2, maio/ago. 2012, p. 84-98
information to the hearer and the latter understands it, a representation 
will arise with him as well (which will, however, probably not be the 
same as the one the speaker has). On the basis of statements like ‘He 
was the 16th president of the U.S.’, ‘He was president during the Civil 
War’ and ‘He was assassinated in 1865’, one forms a representation of 
the historical person. Even if a great number of historical data would turn 
out not to be correct, the representation would remain.
Strawson’s king is an example of the second situation. If only a 
mythical, legendary or otherwise fictive king (fictive in the sense that 
he has no existence in history) is concerned, no problem concerning the 
forming of a representation need arise: one can imagine a man living in 
a palace, being wise, being bald or not and having other properties than 
these. However, if this king is supposed to be the king of France in 2010, 
something peculiar happens.
The speaker may inform the hearer about such a king and produce 
a representation of a king. If he then states: ‘This king of whom I spoke 
is, by the way, the king of France in 2010’, this representation cannot be 
maintained by the hearer. If he knows about France’s form of government, 
he will separate the representation from one about the king of France, so 
the representation is not about the king of France. If he does not know 
about it, the representation won’t be affected, but it won’t be adequate 
as it is not about the king of France. Consequently, ‘Kf 2010 is bald’ does 
not, in contrast to what Strawson and Russell state, have a meaning.
It may be useful to maintain another way of referring than the one 
which is usually utilised. Frege distinguishes between meaning (‘Sinn’) 
and reference (‘Bedeutung’). This distinction is valuable, but, in my 
opinion, not sufficient. If one wants to determine the meaning of a 
sentence, one is dependent on a reference of some parts of the sentence. 
This reference is not the reference and I will henceforth call it ‘secondary 
reference’; ‘reference’ will mean the same as it does with Frege.
In Frege’s example, ‘Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound 
asleep’16, although ‘Odysseus’ has no reference, the sentence has a 
meaning. So, in order for a sentence to have a meaning, a reference 
is not necessary. Still, upon hearing the sentence, one must have 
a representation of Odysseus; this representation is the secondary 
reference.
This is the difference between ‘Odysseus’ and ‘Kf 2010’. In the first 
case, something is represented; if this is not the case, the sentence 
has no meaning. When someone hears about Odysseus for the first   
 
16  See  FREGE, G. “Über Sinn und Bedeutung”, Zeitschrift für Philosophie und 
philosophische. Kritik, 100 (1892), p. 32.J. Doomen – Conceptualizing meaning
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time, a sentence in which the word ‘Odysseus’ occurs may receive a 
meaning: ‘Odysseus sees that the Cyclops is coming’ gives him enough 
information to conclude that Odysseus is some being. One may create a 
representation and conclude that Odysseus is a man, woman, or even an 
animal, but at least one has a representation. The sentence ‘Odysseus 
was seen by Hector’ leaves open a greater number of options. Odysseus 
may as well be a person or animal as an inanimate object. If one connects 
a representation to the name, the sentence does receive a meaning.
In the case of ‘Kf 2010’, this option is not present. Here, the notion 
itself is problematic. ‘Kf 2010’ cannot simply have as its secondary 
reference a representation of a man, woman, animal or object, since 
the representation is one that can never have an equivalent in external 
reality: if it is properly understood, one sees and acknowledges that it 
cannot be maintained. (At least in reality as I know it. In a possible world 
in which France was a monarchy in 2010, ‘Kf 2010 is bald’ may of course 
have a meaning.)
Again, ‘Lincoln’ has a reference, ‘Odysseus’ has a secondary reference 
(whether he has a reference or not, one has a representation of him) and 
‘Kf 2010’ has neither. ‘Lincoln’ has, besides a reference, a secondary 
reference for those who know him, having arranged the information into 
a representation. Only sentences containing something which may have 
a secondary reference have a meaning. This meaning is attributed to 
them by someone hearing or reading them. Meaning cannot, at least not 
by me, be said to be something that exists irrespective of human efforts 
of understanding and dealing with language. Meaning does not play a 
role when someone tries to determine what a sentence means; it may be 
possible that meanings in the sense of independently existing entities 
exist, but whether they do or not seems to be irrelevant. The basis for 
meaning lies in the existence of secondary references, which makes it 
possible for the same sentence to have a meaning for one person and 
fail to have one for another.
There are, however, situations in which no secondary reference 
and hence no meaning can be rendered. ‘Kf 2010’ is an example. This 
phenomenon is also found in the structure of natural languages. In many 
languages a so-called overt subject is used in simple sentences as ‘it 
rains’ (or: ‘it is raining’; ‘es regnet’; ‘il pleut’). Italian, however, lacks such 
a subject. To express that it is raining, the statement ‘piove’ suffices (the 
ending makes clear that the third person singular is concerned). This 
means that the overt subject (‘it’; ‘es’; ‘il’) really has no meaning. Speakers 
of English, German or French have no notion of some thing that rains. It 
consequently has no secondary reference and therefore no meaning. The 
only secondary reference here lies in the ‘raining’ itself: here, something J. Doomen – Conceptualizing meaning
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is imagined. ‘It rains’ is, as it were, a petrified expression: one simply 
uses it, without wondering what the meaning of ‘it’ is. In this situation, 
of course, no problems arise: such expressions merely serve as a means 
to convey information and there are fewer demands imposed on natural 
languages than on formal ones.
Sentences only have a meaning when the thing described has a 
secondary reference. Of course, a sentence can be well formed without 
having a meaning, so this is not a sufficient condition. ‘Kf 2010 met the 
president of the United States of 2010’ is well formed, but has no meaning. 
Hence, the distinction between language and external reality has to be 
acknowledged. When language describes external reality adequately, 
a representation of things in external reality and hence a meaning is 
produced17. So, a secondary reference, be it based on a reference (e.g. 
‘Lincoln’) or not (e.g. ‘Odysseus’) is a prerequisite for a meaning.
2   Implications and problems
2.1
In section 1, secondary reference, which deals with representations, 
has received attention. It has to do with the manner in which an individual 
meaning is produced: for the speaker, the sentence he utters has a 
meaning if it has a secondary reference18. It is now to be examined what 
happens when communication takes place. When two people talk to each 
other about something which gives them both a secondary reference, 
will there be a single meaning (for both)?
Russell rightly points out that descriptions vary for different people19. 
His elaboration for descriptions of historical people is consistent and 
may be maintained. However, this elaboration holds only for cases in 
which objects with a reference are dealt with. According to Russell, no 
object corresponds to a word like ‘Odysseus’. Since he indicates that the 
only thing constant in different circumstances is the object, his theory 
becomes problematic for all sentences with a meaning and without a   
 
17  I have not explored the difficulties which accompany this position or considered its 
alternative, that (external) reality is (partly) determined by language, since it would 
deviate too far from the matters discussed here. That does not mean that it is not an 
important issue, but it may very well be undeterminable.
18  This is a necessary condition, not a sufficient one. To illustrate this by means of the 
example I mentioned at the end of the previous section, the sentence ‘Kf 2010 met the 
president of the United States of 2010’ contains a secondary reference (‘the president 
of the United States of 2010’ has a secondary reference) but lacks a meaning (because 
the other crucial part of the sentence, ‘Kf 2010’, lacks a secondary reference).
19  See RUSSELL, B. The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 
1982, p. 29-30.J. Doomen – Conceptualizing meaning
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reference. I have tried to solve this problem by introducing a secondary 
reference.
When people communicate, there has to be some element which is 
constant (something they can share), otherwise communication would 
be impossible. What is this element? In my opinion, it is that which is 
communicated. When two people are talking about ‘Odysseus’, they may 
have different representations while talking and nevertheless be able to 
have a conversation about him. As long as the things discussed do not 
concern the representations, no problem in communication need arise. 
Person A may have a representation of ‘Odysseus’ according to which 
he is malevolent, person B may have one according to which he is not. 
Only when some property is dealt with, for example his cunningness, 
need they agree20. They can both cling to their own representations about 
other properties, such as his alleged malevolence.
By connecting meaning to a representation, the objection that 
experts decide on issues with which other people are unfamiliar, such as 
distinguishing certain species of trees21, is resolved. This way of looking 
at things puts fewer constraints on the contents of communication than 
most theories do. I think it is plausible to deal with communication like 
this: in what may be called an occamian approach, one may state that all 
that is required for communication is present; there is no need to posit 
any further assumptions. Only if higher demands are made regarding the 
content than necessary need problems arise22.
The alternative view that use is the crucial element23 may be said to 
be unproblematic for some situations, namely those in which one does 
not reflect on one’s words before actually communicating them (and the 
utterance is a spontaneous one) and in cases where the meaning is not 
an issue (in cases where phrases are used metaphorically, for instance).
2.2
I will now devote some attention to problems which may arise 
when things are understood differently by different persons (e.g. when 
person A has a secondary reference and person B does not). Ambiguity 
may play a role in sentences of a natural language. ‘Smith’s murderer is   
 
20  They don’t have to agree with regard to the issue whether he is cunning or not, of course; 
the point is that the conditions to be able to bring up this issue in the first place have 
to be present.
21  See PUTNAM, H. Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995, p. 18-19.
22  See, e.g., PUTNAM, H. Representation and Reality. Cambridge, MA-London: Bradford, 
1989, p. 25.
23  See WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig. “Philosophische Untersuchungen”. In: WITTGENSTEIN, 
Ludwig. Werkausgabe. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, Band 1, 1997, § 43, p. 262.J. Doomen – Conceptualizing meaning
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insane’ can be interpreted in two ways: either the person talked about is 
Smith’s murderer and happens to be insane as well, or Smith’s murderer, 
who-ever he is, is insane (as he murdered Smith). This distinction was 
made by Donnellan, as the referential and the attributive use of definite 
descriptions, respectively24, but in my opinion there is no real problem 
here. The ambiguity is caused by the fact that natural language admits 
such differences. When the sentence is analysed with the aid of logic, as 
will be done in the third section, this ambiguity is solved.
There is, however, another problem. This is about entities which 
lack a simple status in existence. ‘God’ is an example. Does ‘God is 
not malevolent’ have a meaning or not? A number of interpretations 
are possible. One comprises that the speaker thinks that God does not 
exist (and therefore is not malevolent). In this case, the sentence has 
no meaning: there is no entity which is supposed to be malevolent, nor 
is the representation of ‘God’ present for the speaker. ‘God’ is simply a 
word and there is no meaning involved since a secondary reference is 
absent. Another interpretation is the following: God exists and is not 
malevolent. Now, because of the first part of this conjunction (‘God 
exists’), the sentence has a meaning if the speaker believes that God 
exists and lacks one if he does not.
The description receives a status which depends on the opinion of the 
person describing: if he believes in God, the description has a meaning 
and is ‘true’ respectively ‘false’, depending on the belief of the person 
describing, according to whom He is malevolent or not25. If he does not 
believe in Him, it has no meaning and is neither ‘true’ nor ‘false’.
The sentence has a meaning if one thinks that God exists and 
(therefore) has a representation of God (be it limited). Can God be 
described, however? Of course, some properties of God can be named, 
but this does not suffice. He has a particular nature and simply naming 
some properties is not enough to provoke a representation. In the case 
of ‘Odysseus’, it is enough to state that he is a cunning man, who has 
travelled widely, met a number of strange creatures and did battle 
with many men. On the basis of these facts, a representation can be 
produced. Where information is lacking, an abstraction from actual 
persons one knows may fill in the gaps (at least in order to create a 
representation).
24  See DONELLAN, K. “Reference and Definite Descriptions”, The Philosophical Review, 
14 (1966), p. 285. The distinction may, incidentally, be traced back to the Scholastic 
classification of ‘de re’ and ‘de dicto’.
25  A problem here is that this way of thinking leads to a situation in which the person 
describing determines reality; in order to avoid this, I have not treated ‘truth’ as an 
absolute concept.J. Doomen – Conceptualizing meaning
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In the case of God, this option is not present: there are no beings like 
Him (at least none with whom one has, I assume, any acquaintance), 
so all of His properties have to be known in order to create an adequate 
representation. A description of God can, accordingly, not be given. 
Sentences containing ‘God’ have a particular status: one cannot simply 
state that they have a meaning (since a complete description and with 
it a complete representation is missing), nor that they lack one (since 
some people form a representation of God, even if this is limited and does 
not do justice to the object represented in the case it exists). In the last 
section, this will be analysed with the aid of logic.
3   The limits of meaning
An elementary analysis, which will now be presented, is created for 
four sorts of descriptions: those which have a meaning, those which lack 
one, those which may receive a meaning depending on the point of view 
of the hearer and those of which it cannot be determined whether they 
have a meaning or not.
Ambiguities in natural languages are solved when this analysis 
is applied. ‘Smith’s murderer is insane’, from the previous section, is 
ambiguous until the sentence is properly analysed. In the elementary 
analysis, one has to opt for either ‘the person who killed Smith is insane’ 
or ‘that person, who (by the way) killed Smith, is insane’.
In the analysis, the following result is found:
1.  The person who killed Smith is insane: 
($x) ((Mx) ∧ (Mx → Rx) ∧ (∀y)(My → x=y)), 
where ‘M’ stands for ‘murderer of Smith’s’ and ‘R’ for insane’;
2.  That person, who killed Smith, is insane: 
($x) (((Mx) ∧ (∀y)(My → x=y) ∧ Rx)).
Real problems do not emerge until the presence or absence of 
meaning is doubtful. When dealing with a secondary reference one 
may, after having applied the elementary analysis, add a symbol to the 
description in order to state that it has a meaning. I will use the Greek 
letter m for this. Of course, this is not a symbol in predicate logic. Logic 
does not deal with meaning; it merely gives adequate descriptions. (This 
point was already made by Wittgenstein: logic does not say anything26; 
it is simply a condition to be able to say something.)
26  See WITTGENSTEIN, L. “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus”. In: WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig. 
Werkausgabe. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, Band 1, 1997, § 5.43, p. 54.J. Doomen – Conceptualizing meaning
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The elementary analysis of ‘the 16th president of the U.S. had a beard’ 
will be: ($x)(Px ∧ (∀y)(Py → y=x) ∧ Bx) ∧ m), where ‘P’ stands for ‘the 16th 
president of the U.S.’ and ‘B’ for ‘has (or had) a beard’.
The absence of meaning is represented by ‘¬m’. So, ‘the king of France 
in 2010 is bald’ is represented thusly: ($x)((Kx ∧ (∀y)(Ky → y=x) ∧ Qx) ∧ ¬m), 
where ‘K’ stands for ‘the king of France in 2010’ and ‘Q’ for ‘bald’. It 
may appear that ‘there is a king of France in 2010, and he is bald’ is 
incompatible with the fact that this description has no meaning. However, 
‘there is’ is not to be understood ontologically, but semantically: it does 
not imply an existence, but merely conveys that the sentence is at this 
time a candidate for receiving a meaning. ‘There is’ does not mean 
anything by itself here, but may be used meaningfully in some contexts 
(e.g. by saying: ‘there is a chair in this room’ when there is one (cf. the 
example of ‘there are no paintings in this room’ from section 1.2); there 
are, in fact, many words which merely serve as a means and have no 
meaning themselves). If, however, something which lacks a secondary 
reference appears after ‘there is’, this possibility vanishes.
Meaning cannot be acknowledged or denied as easily as in the 
situations displayed above in every case. The sentence ‘God is not 
malevolent’, from the previous section, is an example. I have already 
indicated where the difficulty lies. To elaborate on this point, at least 
three interpretations of the sentence can be discerned.
The first one is fairly simple: it is not the case that God exists; 
therefore, he is not malevolent. This sentence has no meaning, since 
one has no representation when saying or hearing ‘God’ (no secondary 
reference is involved): ¬($x) ((Gx ∧ Sx) ∧ ¬m), where ‘G’ stands for ‘God’ 
and ‘S’ for malevolent. This interpretation is not very likely to occur.
The second interpretation is more complex: God exists and is not 
malevolent. The sentence does not simply have a meaning, based on a 
secondary reference: whether it has one or not depends on the conviction 
of the person dealing with it. Here, a conditional meaning is the case: 
conditional because the speaker’s or hearer’s point of view determines 
the presence or absence of meaning and no absolute statement is the 
case here: ($x) ((Gx ∧ ¬Sx) ∧ (m ∨ ¬m)).
The last and most difficult interpretation is the following: It is not the 
case that there is a God who is malevolent. This interpretation cannot, as 
will become clear, be properly understood. In order to form the sentence, 
no representation has to be created. This requirement is present, however, 
in order to determine whether the sentence has a meaning. It cannot be 
done here, since ‘God’ is, as it were, conditional: only a negative statement 
is made, in which ‘God’ is enclosed. So, determining whether the sentence  
has a meaning is impossible: ¬(($x)(Gx ∧ (∀y)(Gy → y=x) ∧ Sx)(∧ m?)).J. Doomen – Conceptualizing meaning
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In this sentence, a meaning can neither be acknowledged nor denied. 
The sentence cannot even be understood, as an analysis is required 
which one does not seem to be able to perform. This analysis is not 
simply one of all malevolent things, where it is investigated whether God 
is one of them or not. The problem here is not that one is not capable of 
investigating all malevolent things; it is rather that being God involves 
the absence of malevolence.
‘God is not malevolent’ does not have the same status as ‘I see a 
round quadrangle’. ‘I see a round quadrangle’ is a demonstrably absurd 
sentence whereas ‘God is not malevolent’ is not per se; furthermore, 
‘God is not malevolent’ is within the scope of the negation ‘¬’, which 
means that nothing is said – nothing positive, at least: because of this, 
it is impossible to determine whether the sentence has a meaning. In 
the second interpretation, although the sentence was within the same 
scope, this problem did not occur because the sentence was understood 
differently: in that case, the individual person determined whether the 
sentence had a meaning.
It turns out that sentences cannot be dealt with by an elementary 
analysis if it is unclear whether they have a meaning or not. The analysis 
can solve many ambiguities in natural languages, but its limitations 
must be acknowledged: its domain is limited to sentences which have 
or lack a meaning.
Conclusion
In this article, I have tried to show where meaning is to be found and 
to indicate some of the limitations of describing. The first point, that of 
meaningfulness or the lack of it with descriptions in singular cases, which 
was treated in section 1, indicates that a description at a singular level 
does not necessarily render a meaning. This is explained more easily 
when one assumes that meanings are formed in individual situations 
than when meanings are assumed to exist as separate entities.
In section 2, communicative situations turned out to render problems 
in many situations as some descriptions are ambiguous and some depend 
on the convictions the describing parties may have – convictions they 
do not actually hold (one of the parties describing may believe in God, 
for example, while another may not).
In the third section, an analysis was presented on the basis of which 
it was shown that some problems in natural languages may easily be 
solved while others may not; certain ambiguities disappear when one 
applies this analysis, but statements which do not simply have or lack 
a meaning are still problematic. This is caused by the fact that logic has J. Doomen – Conceptualizing meaning
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its limitations, since it is not concerned with the content of sentences 
but merely with the form, whereas establishing whether a sentence has 
a meaning or not involves an investigation of its content.
The analysis given in this article leaves a number of details to be 
worked out and the number of questions it raises may surpass that of the 
answers it provides. It is, furthermore, of course limited to my personal 
stance; another one, from another point of view, can be maintained as 
well. That does not mean, however, that anything else has the same value; 
one has to scrutinise one’s claims in order to be able to say whether they 
are tenable, which some theories do not seem to allow.
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